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NOTES 
FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-Rule 19 
and Indispensable Parties 
The reformulation of compulsory joinder rules, urged by com-
mentators for a decade,1 has been realized with the 1966 amend-
ment to rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Prior to 
the amendment, courts consistently held that the absence from the 
lawsuit of persons who were "indispensable" deprived the court of 
power to adjudicate the action.2 The amendment to rule 19 is an 
effort to establish a methodology which requires a practical consid-
eration of the factual situation at hand when determining the pro-
priety of permitting a case to continue even though certain parties 
are not joined. A brief look at the nature and source of the "indis-
pensability of parties" doctrine is needed in order that the purposes 
of rule 19 and its supposed effects may be more easily understood. 
At common law, parties who possessed joint rights or owed 
joint duties under substantive law had to be joined in a single 
action. Joinder requirements were considered to be annexed to the 
substantive rights of the parties and were thought not to be pro-
cedural devices.3 Familiar examples of parties who possessed such 
rights were partners, joint tenants, and joint promisees under a con-
tract.4 In equity, on the other hand, another approach to compul~ 
sory joinder prevailed; in order to avoid multiplicity of actions, all 
parties that were "necessary to the complete settlement of the con-
troversy" had to be joined.5 The rules in equity were applied with 
a high degree of flexibility, and while all persons who were interested 
in a controversy were to be joined if feasible, such joinder was ex-
cused when it was impractical or impossible.6 During the latter part 
of the eighteenth century, however, the equity courts began to fol-
low the additional rule, not specifically related to their compulsory 
joinder practice, that a decree would not be entered unless it com-
pletely disposed of a controversy.7 The result of superimposing this 
rule upon the necessary joinder rules applicable in equity actions, 
was that the equity courts would refuse to render any decree when-
!. See Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phan-
tom, 61 CoLuM. L. REv. 1254 (1961); Reed, Compulsory ]oinder of Parties in Civil 
Actions (pts.1-2), 55 MICH. L. REv. 327,483 (1957). 
2. See, e.g., Young v. Powell, 179 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1950); Caldwell Mfg. Co. v. 
Unique Balance Co., 18 F.R.D. 258 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). 
3. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 56 (2d ed. 1947). 
4. Ibid. 
5. Ibid. See also Bank of California Nat'l Ass'n v. Superior Court, 16 Cal. 2d 516, 
106 P.2d 879 (1940). 
6. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1255-56. 
7. Hazard, supra note 1, at 1273-82. 
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ever certain parties could not be joined and this nonjoinder might 
give rise to multiple suits.8 
From this curious admixture of the joinder rules and equity's 
insistence upon the perfect decree grew the distinction between 
necessary and indispensable parties.9 While necessary parties were 
classified as those "who ought to be present in order to have a com-
plete and just determination,"10 indispensable persons were defined 
as those who had an interest in the proceedings of such a nature 
that a final decree could not be made "without either affecting that 
interest or leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final 
termination •.. [is] wholly inconsistent with equity and good con-
science."11 In establishing a test whereby necessary and indispens-
able parties could be distinguished, the courts turned to the char-
acter of the parties' substantive rights and asked whether they were 
"severable."12 If the absent party possessed a joint right which was 
not severable, he was "indispensable" and the action had to be dis-
missed unless he could be brought before the court. On the other 
hand, if the nature of the substantive right was "severable," the 
absentee was deemed to be merely a necessary party and the court, 
in its discretion, could proceed without him. Since the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure purported to adopt the flexible equity 
8. In essence, Professor Hazard argues that the real equity joinder principle was 
the necessary party rule, which required that all parties with material interests be 
joined, but which was suspended whenever parties were without the court's juris-
diction. See Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. Jr. 321, 33 Eng. Rep. 1005 (Ch. 1809). 
In Professor Hazard's view, equity's general reluctance to render a decree which did 
not completely dispose of a controversy, when applied to the necessary joinder situa-
tion, gave rise to the indispensable party concept. See Hazax:d, supra note 1, at 1271-82. 
9. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1273-82. 
10. The classic definitions of necessary and indispensable parties are set out in 
Shields v • .Barrows, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854). 
11. Id. at 139. 
12. Ibid. For application of the "severable rights" test, see Halpin v. Savannah 
River Elec. Co., 41 F.2d 329 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 848 (1930); Sechrist v. 
Palshook, 95 F. Supp. 746 (M,D. Pa. 1951); Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp. v. Schrack, 27 
F. Supp. 35 (M.D. Pa. 1939). See generally Note, Multiparty Litigation: Proposed 
Changes in the Federal Rules, 50 IowA L. REv. 1135, 1139-40 (1965). 
The court in Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1936), in setting 
out what was to become the standard test for determining who was an indispensable, 
in contrast to a necewtry, party, listed these four criteria: (1) whether the interest 
of the absent party was distinct and severable; (2) whether in the absence of the 
party the court could render justice between the parties; (3) whether the decree 
could have an injurious effect on the absent party's interest; and (4) whether the 
final determination in the absence of a party was "consistent with equity and good 
conscience." If any of the four questions were answered in the negative, the absentee 
~as. indispe?sab!e· Repeatedly, courts a~plied this test mechanically and unimag-
matively, usmg 1t for the purpose of statmg rather than reaching a result. See, e.g., 
Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1966); McCormick v. Tipton, 259 F.2d 913 
(6th Cir. 1958); Sellers v. Bardill, 132 F. Supp. 386 (W.D. Ky. 1955). See generally 
Reed, supra note 1, at ll55-56; Note, Multiparty Litigation, supra at 1141. 
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approach to joinder,13 only the necessary party rule should have 
been embraced by rule 19.14 Unfortunately, however, the concept 
of indispensable parties was introduced in part (b) of the original 
rule 19, which authorized the courts to order persons "who ought 
to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded" to be joined in 
the action if those persons were not indispensable. No effort was 
made to establish guidelines for determining who was an indispens-
able party; apparently that decision was left to be governed by prior 
case development.15 Consequently, the courts continued to view in-
dispensability in terms of the "severability" of the parties' substan-
tive rights.16 
Rule 19, as amended, sets out specific criteria on the basis of 
which the courts can determine whether a person--described by 
the rule as "contingently necessary"17-should be joined in the 
action. However, the cases cited in the Advisory Committee's Note 
to rule 19 illustrate that the rule is merely codifying the considera-
tions that have always been crucial in determining whether a party 
should be joined18 and thus is embracing the classes of persons 
heretofore designated as either "indispensable" or "necessary."19 
13. See Clark & Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 1291, 1319-21 
(1935). 
14. See note 8 supra. 
15. Judge Charles Clark, Reporter to the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules which 
drafted the original Federal Rules made the following observation: 
In a great number of different instances the only situation where the court 
will not go ahead under these provisions is in the case of what are called in 
equity indispensable parties, and we felt we could not redefine those terms or 
change that situation. I think the whole trend of federal decisions has been to 
cut down the number of parties that are considered indispensable, but that is a 
matter of judicial decision, rather than for procedural rules. 
Quoted in Fink, Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Rule 19, 74 
YALE L.J. 403, 411 n.34 (1965). 
16. See the cases collected in 2 BARRON 8: HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE· 
DURE §§ 513.1-.11 (Wright ed. 1961); and 3 MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,i,r 19.07-.14 
(2d ed. 1966). 
17. FED. R. CIV. P. 19 provides: 
[A person is contingently necessary if] 
(1) in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties, 
or 
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated 
that the disposition of the action in his absence may 
(i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or 
(ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of 
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason 
of his claimed interest. 
For general literature on rule 19 as amended, see Cohn, The New Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, 54 GEO. L.J. 1204 (1966); Fink, supra note 15; Wright, Proposed 
Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 336-37 
(1964); Note, Multiparty Litigation, supra note 12; Comment, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure: Attacking the Party Problem, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 80 (1965). 
18. See generally James, Necessary and Indispensable Parties, 18 U. MIAMI L. REv. 
68 (1963); Reed, supra note l; Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation, 71 
HARv. L. REv. 877 (1958). 
19. 2 BARRON & HOLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 512 (Wright ed. Supp. 1966). 
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The innovation in the amended rule is that it no longer treats the 
absence of a "contingently necessary" person who cannot be made 
a party as grounds for automatic dismissal of the action. The rule as 
amended affirmatively states the factors which are relevant for eval-
uating the propriety of continuing an action in the absence of suc.h 
a party: (I) the effect of a judgment on the interests of the present 
parties and the absentees; (2) the available methods of avoiding 
prejudice to the absentee's interests; (3) the adequacy of the judg-
ment; and (4) the availability of alternative forums.20 While some 
of these factors overlap with those to be considered in deciding 
whether a party is "contingently necessary," the others, namely, the 
court's ability to shape adequate relief and the availability of an 
alternative forum, focus on a separate dimension-the importance 
of the plaintiff's right to a forum for a total adjudication of his 
claim.21 Thus, it is clear from the provisions of the new rule and 
the comments of the draftsmen that a court now has discretion to 
permit a case to continue even though a heretofore so-called "in-
dispensable party" is not joined. The necessary-indispensable dichot-
omy seems to be abolished by the amended version of rule 19 and 
the term "indispensable" is now used only in a conclusive sense-to 
describe those parties in whose absence the court decides that pro-
ceeding with the action would result in an injustice.22 
The first judicial challenge to amended rule 19 was made in 
20. Pre-amendment cases also took cognizance of the relevance of such factors. See 
the cases cited in the Advisory Committee's Note to rule 19, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. ConE CONG, 
&: An. NEWS 779-84. The cases are listed in Fink, supra note 15, at 426-27 n.87. 
21. See New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v . .Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 
1948), where the court observed: "If the suit is dismissed, a wrong may be done to the 
plaintiff •••• In such a situation, the equities of the parties is the basic consideration." 
See also, e.g., Stumpf v. Fidelity Gas Co., 294 F.2d 886 (9th Cir. 1961); Zwack v. Kraus 
Bros., 237 F.2d 255, 259 (2d Cir. 1956). If some type of relief can be administered to 
the plaintiff individually, the court will render that type of decree. See Tardan v. 
California Oil Co., 323 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1963); Ward v. Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 
1953); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 
U.S. 983 (1950). See also Lewis v. Lewis, 358 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1966). The availability of 
another forum where all the parties can be brought in may be sufficient to authorize 
dismissal. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Haynes, 241 F.2d 417 (3d Cir. 1957); Fouke v. 
Schenewerk, 197 F.2d 234,236 (5th Cir. 1952); American Ins. Co. v . .Bradley Mining Co., 
57 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Cal. 1944). A recent case, Pettengill v. United States, 253 F. Supp. 
321 (N.D. Ill. 1966), decided prior to the date upon which the new rule took effect, but 
nevertheless applying the intent of the amendment, shows the type of analysis that is 
promoted by consideration of the plaintiff's right to an adjudication: 
If I find the Florida heir dispensable, the Government must defend three suits. 
The same defense should se1!'e all three cases. If I find her indispensable, the 
taxpayers are completely depnved of any remedy •••• [T]he practical considera-
tions ••• weigh more heavily in favor of the dispensability of the Florida heir 
than in favor of her indispensability. 
Id. at 324. 
22. But see Cohn, supra note 17, at 1211. Professor Cohn fears that courts will 
continue to use the term "indispensable" as a link to the original rule and its 
anachronistic concepts. 
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Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumberman's Mutual 
Casualty Co.,23 wherein the Third Circuit held that the indispens-
able party doctrine is a rule of substantive law which cannot be 
altered by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.24 That rule 19 
cannot accomplish changes in the substantive law is clear from the 
Rules Enabling Act of 1934 which grants to the Supreme Court of 
the United States the "power to prescribe by general rules, the 
forms of process, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and 
procedure of the district courts of the United States in civil actions"25 
and which further provides that "such rules shall not abridge,. en-
large, or modify any substantive right."26 The perimeter of this 
limitation has been marked out by a number of Supreme Court 
decisions which suggest that a rule may regulate only the judicial 
processes for the enforcement of rights and duties recognized by 
the substantive law.27 The test, easily articulated, becomes more 
difficult in application. In one sense, party-joinder may be thought 
to be strictly "procedural" in that it is concerned with the judicial 
administration and management of the litigation of a claim and 
thus falls within the sphere of federal rule-making power. The poli-
cies underlying all types of joinder-claims, remedies, and parties--
are to avoid multiple litigation and to allow parties to have their 
disputes adjudicated more conveniently and inexpensively at a judi-
cial forum. Moreover, the judge-made doctrines of "indispensability" 
are largely self-imposed by courts to effectuate fundamental ideas 
23. 365 F.2d 802 (3d Cir. 1966), 80 HARv. L. REv. 678 (1967), discussed in text 
accompanying notes 30-44 infra. 
24. See Fink, supra note 15, at 430-33. Professor Fink relies heavily on the statement 
of Judge Aldrich in Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775, 778 n.7 (1st Cir. 1964), that "what 
are indispensable parties is a matter of substance, not procedure." 
25. 62 Stat. 961 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). See generally Gavits, 
State Rights and Federal Procedure, 25 IND. L.J. 1, 24 (1949); Miller, Federal Rule 44.1 
and the "Fact" Approach to Determining Foreign Law: Death Knell for a Die-Hard 
Doctrine, 65 MICH, L. REV. 613, 738-46 (1967); Sunderland, Character and Extent of the 
Rule-Making Power Granted U.S. Supreme Court and Methods of Effective Exercise, 21 
A.B.A.J. 404, 406-07 (1935); Tyler, The Origin of the Rule-Making Power and Its 
Exercise by Legislatures, 22 A.B.A.J. 772 (1936); Wickes, The New Rule-Making Power 
of the United States Supreme Court, 13 TEXAS L. REv. 1 (1934); Williams, The Source 
of Authority for Rules of Court Affecting Procedure, 22 WASH. U.L.Q. 459 (1937). 
26. 62 Stat. 961 (1948), as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). 
27. In Sibbach v. Wilson 8e Co., 312 U.S. I, 14 (1941), it was held that "the test must 
be whether a rule really regulates procedure,-the judicial process for enforcing rights 
and duties recoguized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and 
redress for disregard or infraction of them." In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. 
Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 445 (1945), the Court said: "Congress' prohibition of any 
alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not addressed to such inci-
dental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the prescribed new rules of procedure 
upon the rights of litigants." In discussing the applicability of federal rules in diversity 
of citizenship cases, the Supreme Court, in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), 
indicated that the rule-making power was not invalid merely because it altered the 
enforcement of state-created rights. Id. at 473-74. See also Miller, supra note 25, 
at 744-46. 
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of fairness when settling disputes among litigants'. However, despite 
these over-arching considerations, it cannot be denied that histor-
ically there was a close nexus between the substantive rights of the 
parties and compulsory joinder.28 Nonetheless, this relationship 
does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that such joinder is a 
matter of "substance" for Enabling Act purposes. Closely analogous 
to the compulsory joinder situation is the impleader proceeding 
authorized by rule 14. Just as in the case of compulsory joinder, 
an understanding of the substantive rights of the parties under state 
law is preliminary to any application of rule 14 since impleader is 
contingent upon the existence of a right of indemnity under local 
law. Although the validity of the impleader rule has never been 
subjected to a direct challenge based upon the limitations on the 
rule-making power, there is dictum in one opinion that rule 14 is 
properly within the scope of that power.29 Thus, the mere linkage 
of state-created substantive rights with procedural methods for en-
forcement of those rights does not automatically require a conclu-
sion that such procedure is incorporated as part of the substantive 
law. 
A second factor to be considered in attempting to circumscribe 
the domain of procedural rules is the impact of a particular prac-
tice on the rights of litigants; indeed, it was essentially this line of 
approach which was used by the Third Circuit in reaching its de-
cision in Provident Tradesmens. The court relied on an earlier de-
cision of the Fifth Circuit, Perry v. Allen,30 in which the provision 
of rule 25(a)(l) requiring substitution within two years after the 
death of a party was held invalid as an attempt to impose a statute 
of limitations. The Perry court supported its decision on the ground 
that the rule attempted to abridge the appellant's substantive right to 
bring his civil action to trial on the merits. Whether such a right 
exists absolutely is open to question,31 but the Third Circuit in 
Provident Tradesmens accepted the Perry court's statement at face 
value. Provident Tradesmens was an action for a declaratory judg-
ment as to whether the coverage of an insurance policy issued by 
the defendant to one Dutcher, the owner of the automobile, ex-
tended to another person who had been driving the automobile at 
the time of the accident. In the earlier wrongful death action against 
the driver's estate, the defendant insurance company had refused 
28. See notes 3-13 supra and accompanying text. 
29. See D'Onofrio Constr. Co. v. Recon Co., 255 F.2d 904 (1st Cir. 1958), where the 
court said: "It must be recognized that the third-party impleader practice provisions 
promulgated by the Supreme Court in Rule 14 ••• may rationally be regarded as 
dealing with a procedural subject matter and therefore Rule 14 falls within the 
authority delegated to the Supreme Court." Id. at 910. 
l!O. 239 F.2d 107 (5th Cir. 1956). 
31. See Note, 45 CAI.IF. L. REv. 785 (1957); Note, 70 HAll.v. L. REv. 1471 (1957); 
Note, 105 u. PA. L. REv. 1098 (1957). 
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to defend the action, contending that the driver had not been act-
ing within the scope of his permitted use of the automobile. After 
a default judgment was entered in the wrongful death action, this 
declaratory judgment proceeding was commenced, but Dutcher, the 
policyholder, was not joined.32 The trial court's directed verdict in 
favor of the plaintiff driver's estate was reversed by the Third Cir-
cuit, which held, sua sponte,33 that the action must be dismissed for 
failure to join Dutcher. Since the insurance policy was one which 
provided for a set amount of coverage, the Third Circuit viewed 
Dutcher's interest in the policy as adverse to that of the plaintiff 
and "affected" by any decree entered by the court. Therefore, the 
court concluded that Dutcher was indispensable and that it could 
not proceed to a final judgment in his absence. In evaluating the 
effect of amended rule 19 on the case, the court said: 
The indispensable party doctrine is not procedural. It declares sub-
stantive law and accords a substantive right to a person to be joined 
as a party to an action when his interest or rights may be affected 
by its outcome. The indispensable party doctrine is beyond the 
reach of, and not affected by, Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure . . . .34 
Obviously, the court has applied the suggestion made by one 
commentator that rule 19 should be interpreted in such a manner 
that the concept of indispensable parties is not affected.35 However, 
the notes and memoranda from the Advisory Committee's proceed-
ings make it abundantly clear that the rule was amended with the 
primary intention of mitigating the harsh results fl.owing from the 
application of the indispensable parties rule.36 In effect, therefore, 
32. The estate of the deceased driver of the second vehicle and an injured passenger 
sued the defendant insurance company and the insured Dutcher in separate state 
court actions. 
33. FED. R. Crv. P. 12(h)(2) provides that a defense of failure to join an indispensable 
party may be made "In any pleading permitted or ordered under Rule 7a, or by 
motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits." This would 
indicate that if the question is raised on appeal, after a trial and jury verdict, it is 
raised too late. See also :Benger Labs., Ltd. v. R. K. Laros Co., 24 F.R.D. 450 (E.D. Pa. 
1959). 
34. 365 F.2d at 805. It is noteworthy that in Erie contexts the Third Circuit has 
consistently held that the rule of indispensability to be applied in a diversity case is 
that of the state. See Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950); Valley Forge Golf Club v. L. G. De Felice &: Son, 124 
F. Supp. 873 (E.D. Pa. 1954). However, in Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 
1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin v. Iovino, 362 U.C. 949 (1960), the Second Circuit 
made it clear that the substance-procedure analysis employed in diversity litigation 
under Erie does not apply in determining the scope of the Rules Enabling Act. 
35. See Fink, supra note 15, at 425-28. In Stevens v. Loomis, 334 F.2d 775 (1st Cir. 
1964), Judge Aldrich interpreted the omission of any reference to "indispensable 
parties" in the new rule as consistent with the view that indispensability is a matter 
of substance and not procedure; he therefore limited the proposed new rule to clarify-
ing the grounds for proceeding where "necessary" parties could not be joined. 
36. See Advisory Committe Note to Federal Rule 19, H.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 
March 1967] Notes 975 
as the dissent in Provident Tradesmens points out, the majority in 
that case is striking down Federal Rule 19 as invalid and beyond 
the scope of the Enabling Act.37 
The majority in Provident Tradesmens focused on the "sub-
stantive" right of an absent·party to be joined when his interests 
may be "affected by the decree."38 Professor Hazard, in his extensive 
analysis of the history of the indispensable party rule, points out 
that traditionally, at least in equity, joinder has been looked upon 
as a procedural matter.39 In emphasizing that there is no party whose 
absence prevents the issuance of a decree, but rather that there 
may be a party whose absence prevents the rendering of a complete 
decree,40 he should have dispelled all fears that a substantive right 
not to have one's interest affected might exist. Moreover, how can 
an absentee be said to have a substantive right not to have his in-
terest "affected," when traditional notions of collateral estoppel 
and res judicata do not even permit his interest to be legally af-
fected?41 If the court is referring to the factual impact of a decree 
on the interests of an absentee, it does not make sense to talk in 
terms of a substantive right; for carried to its logical extreme, such 
a right would require a court to dismiss a creditor's suit because 
a judgment against the debtor would impair his ability to pay others 
who were not parties to the litigation.42 Moreover, Federal Rule 19 
does not attempt to obliterate any consideration of the absentee's 
rights; such a consideration is still a factor for evaluation. In any 
case, why should an absentee have a substantive right not to have 
his interest affected when he himself has the opportunity to protect 
that interest by intervention43 or when the court may be able to 
2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. CoDE CONG. & Ao. 
NEWS 779-84. The dissenting opinion in Provident Tradesmens, 365 F.2d at 822, 
contains the following explanation of the change in rule 19: 
Rule 19 in effect, therefore, is an effort to restate the liberal view which requires a 
practical consideration of the circumstances and an effort to shape relief to avoid 
injustice rather than the automatic dismissal of the action by applying the label 
of "jurisdictional" defect because an interested person was not made a party. The 
difference b7tween the old and the new Rule 19 is graphically illustrated in the 
change in title. It formerly was entitled "Necessary Joinder of Parties"; it is now 
entitled, "Joinder of Persons Needed for Just Adjudication." Thus, the Committee 
has endeavored to emphasize the importance of equitable, discretionary factors. 
37. 365 F.2d at 822. 
38. The circuit court relied on the district court's ruling that Dutcher was "in-
competent" to testify because his interest in the policy was "adverse" to that of the 
plaintiffs in that "it appears clearly that the measure of Dutcher's protection under 
this policy of insurance is dependent upon the outcome of this suit." 
39. Se~ notes 5-8 supra and accompanying text. See also Hazard, supra note I. 
But see Fmk, supra note 15, who is not impressed with the law-equity distinction. 
40. See Hazard, supra note I, at 1282. 
41. See Reed, supra note 1, at 483. 
42. See Hazard, supra note 1, at 1288-89. See also the dissenting opinion in 
Provident Tradesmens, 365 F.2d at 816. 
43. See, e.g., Parker Rust-Proof Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 105 F.2d 976 (2d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S. 597 (1939). 
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shape relief in such a manner that those rights are protected?44 
The Third Circuit's concern for an individual's substantive 
rights might have been more correctly, or at least more profitably, 
focused on the interest of the defendant who was actually before 
the court and who might have been prejudiced by the possibility 
of inconsistent decisions and multiple liability.45 Because of the par-
ticular facts of Provident Tradesmens, the defendant insurance 
company may have found itself liable to Dutcher for indemnifica-
tion of judgments rendered in the state court actions, as well as to 
the deceased's estate in the present declaratory judgment action. 
Historically, however, protection against multiple liability has al-
ways been viewed as an equitable matter and one within the dis-
cretion of the court.46 Furthermore, as the dissent in Provident 
Tradesmens perspicaciously notes, the evils involved in a race to 
collect against the fund can be readily guarded against by a pro-
vision in the decree to the effect that the insurer defendant is not 
required to make any payment under the policy until Dutcher has 
had an opportunity to present any claims that he may have as a re-
sult of the state court determinations.47 · 
It must also be remembered that the distinction between "sub-
stance" and "procedure" rests on shifting grounds, since what may 
be classified as "substance" or "procedure" for Enabling Act pur-
poses may not be so categorized for other purposes, notably the Erie 
and conflict-of-laws situations. Consequently, rather than attempting 
to uncover some objective line of demarcation between "substance" 
and "procedure," any judicial inquiry should concentrate on the 
purpose for which the distinction is being made.48 In the case of 
the federal rule-making power, an insight into the purpose for the 
distinction may be gleaned from congressional history, which in-
dicates a desire to leave the Supreme Court free to make rules 
"which would regulate all means and facilities which courts make 
available to enforce rights, and to limit only the making of those 
44. See, e.g., Tardan v. California Oil Co., 323 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1963); Ward v. 
Deavers, 203 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 
760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950). 
45. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), the Supreme 
Court intimated that the right to be immune from double liability may be a con-
stitutional right. This idea is explored in Fink, supra note 15, at 421. While the 
Western Union case does show a concern for the threat of double liability, the due 
process issue may be limited to the situation in which a court's jurisdiction is based on 
property within the state. 
46. Compare Mahr v. Union Fire Ins. Soc'y, 127 N.Y. 452, 28 N.E. 391 (1891), with 
Petrogradsky Bank v. National City Bank, 253 N.Y. 23, 170 N.E. 479 (1930). 
47. 365 F.2d at 819. 
48. Cf. Iovino v. Waterson, 274 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied sub nom. Carlin 
v. Iovino, 362 U.S. 949 (1960). See also Cook, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Con• 
fiict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333 (1933). 
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rules which would alter the character of rights to be determined 
by a final judgment on the merits. "49 
Assuming that Federal Rule 19 can be sustained as within the 
scope of the Enabling Act, the rule must still be approved as within 
the bounds of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins50 in order to be applied in a 
49. Sunderland, supra note 25, at 406. Not only must one recognize that the Advisory 
Committee which drafted rule 19 and the Supreme Court which approved the rule 
were confident of their power to effect changes in concepts of indispensability, but 
also that the New York and Michigan rule-making committees, both limited to 
"regulating procedure," had previously formulated liberal joinder provisions which 
impinged on anachronistic definitions of indispensable parties. N.Y. Civ. Prac. L. &: 
R. § 1001 (McKinney 1963); Mich. Court Rule 205 (1961). The notion that the "in-
dispensability rule is still preserved" as argued by Fink, supra note 15, at 428, is refuted 
in 2 WEINSTEIN, KORN, &: MILLER, N.Y. ADVISORY COMMITI'EE ON PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
§ 1001.01 (1965): 
[Under the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules] the practice remains essen-
tially unchanged and well-reasoned precedents holding parties "necessary" are still 
useful. This does not mean, however, that courts should dismiss in every case 
where previously a party might have been held "indispensable." 
The commentary on the Michigan rule is even more explicit. As interpreted in 1 
HONIGMAN &: HAWKINS, MICHIGAN CoURT RULES ANNOTATED 552 (1962), the rule alters 
previous notions of "indispensable parties": 
Prior to the adoption of the new rules, joint obligees were traditionally required 
to join in the prosecution of a claim on the obligation •••. Since the presence of 
all joint obligees is essential to permit the court to render complete relief, this 
joinder requirement will be continued under Rule 205.I. . 
If a joint obligee is beyond the jurisdiction of the court, his absence need not 
deter the court from proceeding under sub-rule 205.2. • . • Most frequently the 
lack of an alternative remedy if the suit is dismissed will outweigh the possibility 
of a multiplicity of suits and resulting harassment of the defendant and the court 
if the action proceeds. 
As a postscript, it might be noted that FED. R. CIV. P. 19 may be vulnerable to a 
challenge that the indispensable parties rule is "jurisdictional" and that, as amended, 
rule 19 violates FED. R. CIV. P. 82 by altering jurisdiction. Today, however, that theory 
is generally regarded as fallacious. See, e.g., Bry-Man's Inc. v. Stute, 312 F.2d 585, 587 
(5th Cir. 1963); Washington v. United States, 87 F.2d 421, 431 (9th Cir. 1936). Much of 
the confusion underlying the theory of jurisdictional defect results from the con-
sequences that may occur in diversity situations. See, e.g., Kendig v. Dean, 97 U.S. 423 
(1879); Calcote v. Texas Pac. Coal&: Oil Co., 157 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1946). 
50. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie required a federal court in diversity cases to apply the 
substantive law of the state in which it was sitting, whether that law was statutory or 
decisional. A more restrictive requirement was authorized in Guaranty Trust Co. v. 
York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945), where federal courts were bound to look to state law if that law 
would significantly affect the outcome of the litigation. The retreat from the outcome-
determinative test was begun with Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 
U.S. 525 (1958), where the court stressed the necessity of balancing state and federal 
interests in determining whether to apply state or federal law. Most recently in Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), the Supreme Court appears to have authorized the 
application of all federal rules of procedure in diversity cases. The relationship of the 
Erie doctrine and various federal "procedural" practices is analyzed in Miller, supra 
note 25, at 702-15. For the history of the Erie doctrine as it has evolved, see generally 
Clark, ~tate Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of Erie v. 
Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267 (1946); Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 
Nw. U.L. REv. 427, 541 (1958); Horowitz, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins-A Test To Determine 
Those Rules of State Laws To Which Its Doctrine Applies, 23 S. CAL. L. REv. 204 
(1950); Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the Supreme Court, and the Erie Doctrine in 
Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187 (1957); Meador, State Power and the Federal Judicial 
Power, 49 VA. L. REv. 1082 (1963); McCoid, Hanna v. Plumer: The Erie Doctrine 
Changes Shape, 51 VA. L. REv. 884 (1965); Merrigan, Erie to York to Ragan-A. Triple 
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diversity case in a federal court.51 Before the redrafting of rule 19, 
there was a split of authority as to whether federal or state decisions 
were the proper source of law governing the question of indispens-
ability. 52 While the issue was never resolved by the Supreme Court, 
an illuminating discussion of the problem was presented by the 
Fifth Circuit in Kuchenig v. California.53 In that case, the court 
opined that any resolution by it of a conflict between the federal 
rule and state practice would be premature since the federal rule 
did not specifically speak to the problem in that it did not delineate 
any standard of indispensability; the court therefore focused on the 
more limited question of whether to consult state or federal prece-
dents in determining indispensability.54 Now that rule 19 specifically 
articulates criteria for deciding whether an action may continue, 
the question concerning the source of governing law must be re-
solved, and the resolution should be made in light of the Supreme 
Court's most recent Erie-based decision, Hanna v. Plumer.55 In 
Hanna, the Supreme Court appears to have held that whenever 
there is a clash between a federal rule and local practice, the federal 
rule applies unless it can be demonstrated that "the Advisory Com-
mittee, this Court and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment 
Play on the Federal Rules, 3 VAND. L. REv. 711 (1950); Smith, Blue Ridge and Beyond: 
A Byrd's-Eye View of Federalism in Diversity Litigation, 36 TuL. L. REv. 443 (1962); 
Tunks, Categorization and Federalism: "Substance" and "Procedure" After Erie Rail-
road v. Tompkins, 34 ILL. L. REv. 271 (1939); Vestal, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins: A 
Projection, 48 IOWA L. REv. 248 (1963); Note, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 1382 (1966); Note, 51 
CORNELL L.Q. 551 (1966); Note, 1966 DUKE L.J. 142; Note, 27 Omo ST. L.J. 345 (1966). 
51. See McCoid, supra note 50, at 908 n.114. See also ADVISORY COMMIITEE ON CIVIL 
RULES, TENTATIVE PROPOSAL To CLARIFY NECESSARY JOINDER OF PARTIES-RULE 19, 
PRELIMINARY MEMO: THE RELEVANCE OF STATE LAW (1962). 
52. Federal law governs: Resnik v. La Paz Guest Ranch, 289 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 
1961); Green v. Green, 218 F.2d 130 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 917 (1955); 
Cowling v. Deep Vein Coal Co., 183 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1950); Lawrence v. Sun Oil Co., 
166 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1948); De Korwin v. First Nat'! Bank, 156 F.2d 858 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946); Grace v. Carroll, 219 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 
New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Brandenburg, 8 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1948). State 
law governs: Strachan v. Nisbet, 202 F.2d 216 (7th Cir. 1953); Dunham v. Robertson, 
198 F.2d 316 (10th Cir. 1952); Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 F.2d 760 
(3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950); Richmond Lace Works, Inc. v. Epstein, 
31 F.R.D. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Campbell v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 148 F. Supp. 209 
(D. Idaho 1957); Valley Forge Golf Club v. L. G. De Felice 8c Son, 124 F. Supp. 873 
(E.D. Pa. 1954); Baker v. Dale, 123 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Mo. 1954); Redfern v. Collins, 
113 F. Supp. 892 (E.D. Tex. 1953); Platte County v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6 
F.R.D. 475 (D. Neb. 1946). See generally Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 992. 
53. 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966). 
54. In Kuchenig, the court noted that indispensability was a judicially self-imposed 
limitation and therefore was linked with matters of procedure. On the other hand, it 
recognized that indispensability controlled whether an action would be dismissed, and 
that disparities would directly affect the outcome of an action and therefore encourage 
forum-shopping. 
55. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
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that the rule in question transgresses neither the terms on the En-
abling Act nor constitutional restrictions."56 This language, if read 
literally, would seem to authorize the application in diversity cases 
of every federal rule that is legitimately within the scope of the 
Enabling Act. However, the problems presented by contrary de-
terminations of indispensability are of a different nature than those 
posed by state-federal divergence with respect to the manner of serv-
ing process involved in Hanna. Hanna forced the litigant merely 
to alter the way in which he serves process and to abide by the 
proper rules of the chosen forum. In the case of joinder of indis-
pensable parties, however, the state standards for determining in-
dispensability may be such that the litigant is completely deprived 
of any means by which he may avail himself of the state forum.57 
In effect, a state determination of indispensability is analogous to a 
"door-closing statute" which causes a difference in outcome at the 
very outset of the litigation since it concerns the right of the plaintiff 
to have his case heard in the first instance.58 Consequently, unlike 
the effect of the differing practices regarding service of process, the 
ability to bring suit in a federal court and the inability to do so in 
a state court for reasons of indispensability may well have relevance 
to the choice of a forum and raise the sort of equal protection prob-
lems posed in Erie.59 However, there is strong support for the propo-
sition that administrative considerations have dictated the content 
of judge-made rules as to when a party is indispensable and that 
therefore a federal court should rely upon its own practices in eval-
uating the propriety of proceeding without a particular party. 60 
In view of the doubt concerning the true source of the indispens-
ability rule61 and its apparent ability to be rationally classified as 
56. Id. at 472. 
57. See Developments in the Law, supra note 18, at 888. 
58. Cf. Angel v • .Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947). Compare Arrowsmith v. United 
Press Int'I, 320 F.2d 219, 226-27 (2d Cir. 1963) (en bane), with Jaftex Corp. v. Randolph 
Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508, 512-16 (2d Cir. 1960). 
59. The problem is noted in Kuchenig v. California, 350 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 985 (1966). See also Miller, supra note 25, at 712-15. At this point, 
it is appropriate to note that it is unlikely that sharp collisions with state law will 
often arise, since the tests incorporated in amended rule 19 reflect equitable principles 
common to the law of all American jurisdictions and embrace the strong discretionary 
element running through the entire law of party-joinder, both state and federal. See 
ADVISORY CoMMITIEE ON CML RULES, TENTATIVE PROPOSAL, supra note 51. 
60. See 2 BARRON &: HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 512 n.21.14; Developments in 
the Law, supra note 18, at 888. 
61. See Fink, supra note 15, at 431. Professor Fink himself admitted the confusion 
surrounding the historical origin of the indispensable party doctrine: 
Until we have an adequate theory of what the indispensable parties rule is, 
it is hardly possible to determine whether it is a rule of substantive law. It would 
seem that the indispensable parties rule is a rule of substantive law if failure to 
join an indispensable party goes to the court's "power to render a decree," is a 
"fatal error," or is, in itself, a violation of due process of law. On the other hand, 
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either "substance" or "procedure,"62 the strong federal policy em-
braced in rule 19 should prevail. 
There would still appear to be a narrow category of cases in 
which a federal court could run afoul of Erie. I£ a state were to pass 
a statute granting to the plaintiff a particular right of action only 
if he joins with him certain other persons,63 a federal court might 
be precluded from allowing the action to proceed.64 However, in 
light of Mr. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Hanna, in which 
he criticizes the majority for sanctifying any legitimately adopted 
federal rule of procedure regardless of its impact on a "State's sub-
stantive regulation of the primary conduct and affairs of its citi-
zens,''65 it is conceivable that even in the extreme situation posed 
in the hypothetical, the majority would insist upon preserving the 
integrity of the federal rules. In this context, it might be more ap-
propriate to balance the state and federal interests. Thus, assuming 
a strong substantive state policy not based on mere judicial admin-
istration factors, the state rule should be effectuated. But, absent 
such direct and specific clarification by the state, Hanna and the 
philosophy it represents purports to teach that federal policies, and 
in particular, those bound up with the federal judicial system, are 
not to be categorically dismissed in favor of state practice, even to 
guarantee identity of result.66 Rule 19 embodies a conclusive federal 
attitude toward compulsory joinder in a federal court and this sig-
nificant federal policy should prevail.67 
if joinder requirements are merely means of adjudicating rights, and, within the 
confines of fairness which procedural due process always requires, are discretionary 
rules ••• then joinder requirements may be thought to be procedural. 
Ibid. 
62. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), seemed to authorize congressional rule-
making power for those matters which, "though falling within the uncertain area 
between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of classification as either," Id. 
at 472. 
63. That joinder is a matter of state substantive law might be inferred from the 
passage of such a statute. 
64. See 2 BARRON & HoLTZOFF, op. cit. supra note 16, § 511. This theory is based on 
the unstated premise that the Supreme Court, despite the Rules Enabling Act, is im-
potent to promulgate a rule for diversity cases touching on a matter that a state has 
deemed a facet of substantive policy. 
65. 380 U.S. at 475-76. 
66. See Miller, supra note 25, at 721-22. 
67. See Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule 19, R.R. Doc. No. 391, 89th Cong., 
2d Sess. 33-36 (1966), reprinted in 39 F.R.D. 89-94 (1966), 1966 U.S. ConE CoNG. & An. 
NEWS 779-84. See generally Rippey v. Denver United States Nat'l Bank, 260 F. Supp. 704 
(D. Colo. 1966). 
